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Abstract—Semantic social engineering attacks are a pervasive
threat to computer and communication systems. By employing
deception rather than by exploiting technical vulnerabilities,
spear-phishing, obfuscated URLs, drive-by downloads, spoofed
websites, scareware and other attacks are able to circumvent
traditional technical security controls and target the user directly.
Our aim is to explore the feasibility of predicting user suscepti-
bility to deception-based attacks through attributes that can be
measured, preferably in real-time and in an automated manner.
Towards this goal, we have conducted two experiments, the first
on 4333 users recruited on the Internet, allowing us to identify
useful high-level features through association rule mining, and
the second on a smaller group of 315 users, allowing us to study
these features in more detail. In both experiments, participants
were presented with attack and non-attack exhibits and were
tested in terms of their ability to distinguish between the two.
Using the data collected, we have determined practical predictors
of users’ susceptibility against semantic attacks to produce and
evaluate a logistic regression and a random forest prediction
model, with accuracy rates of .68 and .71 respectively. We have
observed that security training makes a noticeable difference
in a user’s ability to detect deception attempts, with one of
the most important features being the time since last self-study,
while formal security education through lectures appears to be
much less useful as a predictor. Other important features were
computer literacy, familiarity and frequency of access to a specific
platform. Depending on an organisation’s preferences, the models
learned can be configured to minimise false positives or false
negatives or maximise accuracy, based on a probability threshold.
For both models, a threshold choice of 0.55 would keep both false
positives and false negatives below 0.2.
Index Terms—Security, Cyber crime, Social Engineering, Se-
mantic attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Semantic social engineering attacks target the user-computer
interface in order to deceive a user into performing an action
that will breach a system’s information security [1]. On any
system, the user interface is always vulnerable to abuse by
authorised users, with or without their knowledge. Traditional
deception-based attacks, such as phishing emails, spoofed
websites and drive-by downloads, have shifted to new and
emerging platforms in social media [2], cloud applications [3]
and near field communications [4]. Efforts towards technical
defence against semantic attacks have lead to the development
of solutions that are typically specific in design. This can
be attributed to the sheer complexity required to translate
what is essentially human deception into code, as well as
attempting to combine this into a solution that spans disparate
platforms. One example is phishing emails, where filtering and
classification software have proven to be highly successful [5]–
[7]. However, these defence mechanisms are built to function
on email systems only, unable to prevent conceptually very
similar phishing attacks in instant messaging, social media and
other platforms. Similarly, automated tools developed to block
drive-by downloads via web browsers have been shown to be
highly effective in mitigating the threat [8], [9], yet the same
tools cannot prevent a drive-by attack in removable media.
Alternative approaches to technical solutions have focused
on managing users themselves, rather than the computer
interface. For example, creation of policy and process for
user compliance [10] has helped to define specific rules
which enforce secure system use, but these are almost never
applicable to the private user of a computer system and the
Internet. Furthermore, compliance guidelines are usually static
in nature and therefore can quickly become out-of-date when
new attack methods appear. User education and awareness
training have been evaluated extensively and in practice have
been shown to improve user responses to specific attack
scenarios [11], [12], but it is difficult to automate this process
and even more difficult to measure its lasting effect. Moreover,
training material tends to be limited to known exploitations
and requires regular updates to include new attack vectors.
Systems generating visual warnings or security indicators have
also been implemented, presented to users in real-time by
indicating a possible attack or whether a potential threat exists,
but research has shown that in practice users often do not pay
attention to them or do not understand them [13].
A comprehensive survey by Khonji et al. [14] evaluating
the state of phishing detection provides a valuable insight into
potential future defences. The researchers have highlighted
the application of machine learning techniques as a promising
approach to defence, producing accurate attack classifiers and
effective defences against zero-day threats. Measuring the
effectiveness of user training has also been suggested, where
research towards a hybrid user/software solution is indicated
as a potential multi-layered approach to protection.
Given the limitations of defences designed for specific
attacks and platforms, it is attractive to look also towards
the feasibility of predicting a user’s susceptibility to different
semantic attacks in order to augment technical systems with
user-driven defence. For example, user susceptibility profiles
can be used to support systems that are dynamic, by training
predictors with user data collected in real-time or over a
period of time, and allowing dynamic allocation of access
rights dependent on a detected user profile. Furthermore,
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awareness systems, where training material would be tailored
to users depending on their susceptibility to different deception
vectors. User susceptibility profiles can also provide useful
measurement criteria for predicting the performance of human
sensors of semantic attacks, indicating whether a user report
of a suspected attack is accurate (and worth investigating);
sharing analogies to the learning and prediction capabilities
employed in sandbox antivirus defences for categorising and
identifying different malware families [15]. Towards this vi-
sion, we have conducted two experiments with the participants
being asked to tell whether particular exhibits show an attack
or not. We have collected data regarding both the users and
their performance in detecting attacks that employ different
deception vectors [1] and have developed two prediction mod-
els. The first experiment helped identify high level predictors
that can be measured ethically, automatically and in real-time,
whilst being applicable across the wider Internet population;
we define this study as stage 1. The second experiment helped
build upon the initial predictor features by further dissecting
each into a series of sub-features used to predict susceptibility
against new attacks using a smaller population; we define this
as stage 2.
II. PREDICTING SUSCEPTIBILITY
A. Related Work
In computer security, it is usually computer systems, net-
works, applications and data that are monitored to be able to
detect and mitigate threats. Researchers have also attempted
to monitor and profile unauthorised users [16], [17] or witting
insiders performing unauthorised actions [18]. However, se-
mantic social engineering attacks target authorised users and
lure them into performing an authorised (albeit compromising)
action. Recent research in this area has focused on demo-
graphic attributes and psychological indicators as methods
for predicting user susceptibility. For example, in the field
of behavioural science, research has explored the impact of
personality traits [19], influencing and persuasion techniques
[20] as measurement criteria for predicting susceptibility to
semantic attacks. A study carried out in [21] has reported that
female participants exhibiting neurotic behaviour were more
likely to respond to phishing emails than female and male
participants that did not. More recently, the same researchers
have conducted a spear-phishing field-experiment, where the
tendency for conscientiousness reported a high correlation to
phishing susceptibility [22]. Research in [23] has reported
openness, positive behaviour (e.g., use of language) and high
levels of conversationalist activity as predictors of vulnera-
bility to an online social network bot. In [24], researchers
have conducted a survey and field experiment of phishing
attacks which found that participants who demonstrated higher
degrees of normative, affective and continuance commitment,
obedience to authority and trust, to be more susceptible to
phishing. Similar results were also reported in a recent study
in [25], where submissiveness and trust predicted higher
susceptibility to phishing emails. Crucially, these personality
traits were also found to perform consistently as predictors of
susceptibility amongst participants from different geographical
locations, in this case Australia and Saudi Arabia.
Demographic research has considered Internet usage and
behaviour as prediction criteria of susceptibility to semantic
attacks. In particular, it has been reported that users who have
knowledge of or take guidance from visual cues (security
indicators, source, design, language, etc.) on technology plat-
forms are often good predictors of susceptibility. For example,
[26], [27], [28] and [29] have all reported a lower degree of
susceptibility to phishing attacks in emails and websites when
the participants are aware of security indicators and visual
components. However, in many cases participants did not
understand what the security indicators meant and the varying
severity of their message. In fact, in [30] and [31], it has been
reported that the effect of habitation to the visual cues and
especially security warnings increases susceptibility to attacks.
Where studies have included general demographic elements
such as age and gender, a number of studies have reported
that female participants were found to be more susceptible to
phishing attacks than male participants [22], [32]–[34]. In [11],
users were measured demographically as to whether they have
had training on the phishing email training system PhishGuru,
where the number of training sessions taken by users are
used as input features to identify the lasting effect of the
training. It was found that having completed training sessions
on PhishGuru is an accurate predictor of lower susceptibility
to phishing emails.
Technical prediction systems have been previously proposed
in [35] and more recently [36]. The first describes a system
which would present users through a series of information se-
curity related questions within a web pop-up. Then, the system
uses a series of weighted decision algorithms to quantify the
user’s degree of susceptibility based on the responses to the
questions, and accordingly displays a visual indicator of sus-
ceptibility to the user as a form of awareness mechanism. No
security enforcing functions are implemented. To date, there is
no further information regarding its practical implementation
and evaluation. The latter, and more recent study empowers
user to report whether an email is a suspected phishing
attack. Based on prior knowledge and in-line warnings, correct
reporting conversely highlights predictor features for phishing
susceptibility.
Table I provides an overview of the literature associated to
susceptibility research in semantic social engineering attacks.
In the “Technical measurement” set of columns, we have
identified for each study whether the predictors of suscep-
tibility can be realistically measured by a technical system
in real-time, automatically and ethically. By ethical, we refer
to aspects of diversity and inclusion related to protected
personal characteristics [37], and we extend this to also include
personality traits, where decision making based on assessment
of personality types are argued to be a form of discrimination
[38].
The available literature for predicting user susceptibility
to semantic social engineering attacks is not as mature as
other areas of computer security. Most related studies have
been constrained by small sample sizes and predictors that
are difficult to generalise across a multitude of semantic
3Pub. Attack Type* Methodology Participants
Practicality of predictors
Key findings for reducing [-] or increasing [+] susceptibility
Ethical Real-time Automatic
[26] E Exhibit survey 179 [-] Knowledge of technical and visual cues
[27] E Interview, role-play 20 [-] Familiarity with specific attacks, [-] visual cues
[29] E/W Exhibit test 17 [-] User guided by technical and visual cues
[28] W Role-play 232 [-] Knowledge of attacks, technical and visual cues
[24] E Survey, simulated phishing 588 [+] Normative, affective, continuance, obedience commitment, trust
[30] E/W Survey, role-play 70 [-] Interactive browser warnings, [+] platform habitation
[11] E Simulated phishing 515 [-] Trained on an embedded phishing email training system
[32] E Role-play 1,001 [+] Ages 18-24, [+] Gender (Female, attr. less technical training)
[33] E Analysis, survey, interview 224 [+] Gender (Female), [-] non-exposure to deceptive visual cues
[39] E Survey, simulated phishing 446 [-] Comp. self-efficacy, web experience, security knowledge, suspicion
[40] E Survey 64 [-] Tailored susceptibility message
[31] E Survey, simulated phishing 321 [-] Knowledge+attention+cues+elaboration [+] load triggered habitation
[41] B Social media experiment 500 [+] High platform activity, openness, positive behaviour (e.g., language)
[23] E Simulated phishing 10,917 [-] Gender (Female), [-] Age (18-21),
[42] E Survey, Training experiment 321 [-] Attention to deception indicators, attack knowledge
[43] E Test assessment 210 [-] Computer security self efficacy and proven attack knowledge
[21] E Survey, simulated phishing 100 [+] Neurotic personality trait
[44] E Simulated phishing 2,624 [+] Cialdini’s influence techniques + self/non-self determination
[25] E Survey 296 [+] Submissiveness, trust, [-] Visual cues & important privacy data
[22] E Simulated phishing attack 40 [+] Gender (Female), conscientiousness, self-efficacy
[45] W Simulated phishing 21 [-] Gaze time on browser chrome elements
[46] W Simulated phishing 173 [-] Knowledge combined with Familiarity and HTTPS indicators
Experiment 1 E/W/W1/S/A/Q Exhibit test 4,333 [-] Security training, platform freq., familiarity & self-efficacy
Experiment 2 E/W/A/T/S1 Exhibit test 315 [-] Security training, platform freq., dur. & familiarity, self-efficacy
* E = Phishing emails/IMs, W = phishing websites, B = Online social network bot, S = search engine poisoning, W1 = WiFi evil twin, A = Fake app
Q= QRishing, T= Typosquating, S1 = Scareware
TABLE I: Related research in the field of semantic social engineering attacks
attacks. To some extent, this is due to the fact that most
researchers focus only on phishing attacks, which is only one
section of the problem space [1]. Specialised training systems
have been shown to work well [11], as well as technical
models combining demographic and behavioural attributes
[31], but they are application-specific and do not consider other
deception vectors that might be employed in semantic attacks.
Therefore, it is difficult with the results produced from current
studies to generalise across a wide range of attack types and it
is unclear which of the research results could be realistically
integrated into a technical system for defence.
To overcome these limitations and as our aim is focused on
facilitating the development of technical defence systems, we
only select predictor terms that can be collected and measured
in real-time, automatically and ethically. We argue that in order
to predict susceptibility to a wide range of semantic attacks,
the mechanism for measuring susceptibility should be naive
to low-level and attack-specific parameters (e.g., sender source
and body of text within an email, URL composition in website
post, etc.).
B. Indicators of susceptibility
To identify practical indicators, we start with five high-
level concepts associated to user knowledge, experience and
behaviour:
Security Training (S): Refers to the individual’s type of
computer security training. Prediction of susceptibility by
computer security training has been shown to produce accurate
results [11], but the approach can be limited by the specialised
system delivering the training or the specific training curricu-
lum. For example, it is likely that a user who is self-trained will
cover a wider range of material relevant to their technology
profile than an employee who has only received work-based
training on systems the organisation uses. Moreover, the long-
term benefit of training and skill fade is not clear.
Familiarity (FA): Refers to the familiarity the individual
has with a given platform. Familiarity is a key enabler of
distinguishing between what visually looks normal and what
is normal behaviour. For example, in [27], [28], the researchers
have identified familiarity with specific attacks and visual cues
as key predictors of susceptibility, both of which describe how
a user identifies what is normal visually or behaviourally on a
system and what is not. Similar findings were also reported in
[29], with knowledge of visual cues being attributed to famil-
iarity with the type of platform used. In this context, platform
habitation [30] is a factor that can increase susceptibility to
semantic attacks, facilitated in part by platform familiarity. At
the same time, without familiarity a user may be unaware how
a system should normally look and behave, and consequently
may fail to detect an attack or may see threats where they do
not exist.
Frequency (FR): Refers to the frequency with which the
individual accesses the type of platform. A user who accesses
a specific type of platform (e.g., social media websites) very
frequently may be more aware of the kind of attacks that
occur within that type of platform, regardless of their actual
familiarity with the specific providers platform (e.g., with
Google+ social network site).
Duration (DR): Refers to the duration for which the indi-
vidual accesses the type of platform. Similarly to FR, a user
who uses a specific type of platform for long periods may be
more aware of the kind of attacks that occur within that type
of platform. However, it is also possible that the longer the
4duration the higher risk of platform habitation which may or
may not have an adverse effect [41].
Computer Literacy (CL) and Security Awareness (SA):
Refers to the user’s self-efficacy in respect to their computer
literacy and computer security awareness. A user’s self-
identified level of computer literacy and computer security
awareness has been observed to be an important predictor in
numerous studies seeking to identify what influences reduced
susceptibility to phishing emails [22], [39], [43]. Overall, self-
efficacy was found to accurately represent a user’s expectation
of their ability to use a computer system competently and
securely. However, self-efficacy implicitly harbours a degree
of bias depending on the user’s honesty and the accuracy and
practicality of the measurement scale used. While we count it
here as practical, we assume that in actual application, both
CL and SA would need to be validated against evidence (e.g.,
with some form of testing, certification, etc.).
III. METHODOLOGY
Figure 1 summarises our two-stage experimental approach.
In stage 1, we have conducted a large scale experiment, where
we applied data mining techniques to try and identify whether
relationships and associations exist between the different indi-
cators of susceptibility described in Section II-B. In stage 2,
we have utilised the results from the stage 1 analysis to apply
a greater degree of granularity (and measurability) to each of
the indicators highlighted through the data mining process.
These refined predictor features were then employed in a
second experiment in order to determine practical predictors
of susceptibility and develop a model to form a susceptibility
classifier.
Fig. 1: Experiment approach and methodology
Both experiments were designed to be quantitative in nature
in order to generate numerical data that could be transformed
into usable statistics. Some qualitative data was captured in
experiment 2, where users were asked to explain in free-text
for each exhibit why they had classified it as an attack or non-
attack; this data was used to eliminate sample “noise”, such as
participants who guessed or marked all exhibits as attacks (or
non-attacks). Furthermore, attack exhibits were randomised so
that participants could not guess the order between attack and
non-attack exhibits in the susceptibility test.
Both experiments were implemented in the online survey
platform Qualtrics and consisted of a short survey that col-
lected demographic and platform behaviour data, followed
by an exhibit-based susceptibility test. In total, after sample
cleaning and pre-processing, experiment 1 consisted of 4,333
participant responses, and experiment 2 consisted of 315
participant responses. Both experiments provided participants
with a study brief prior to commencing the survey, so as to
ensure they understood how to proceed with answering the
survey and exhibit test questions.
The research was approved by our institution’s research
ethics committee and participants were informed of the pur-
pose of the study prior to providing online consent and
confirmation of being over 18 years of age. Furthermore, all
data were anonymised and participants were also given the op-
portunity to opt out of the study analysis after completing the
test; participants who opted out had their responses removed
from the study.
Fig. 2: Number of survey participants by geographical location
for Experiment 1
Fig. 3: Number of survey participants by geographical location
for Experiment 2
A. Recruitment
1) Experiment 1: In the first experiment, participants were
cultivated via an online advertisement challenging people to
take a test of their susceptibility to semantic social engineering
attacks. This advertisement was posted in a number of popu-
lar online forums and social media communities, including
5Fig. 4: Experiment 1: Exhibit 5 (screenshot) - Fake “Clickbait” app on Facebook
Reddit, StumbleUpon, Facebook and Twitter. Additionally,
undergraduate and research students were recruited via email.
The recruitment methodology of presenting the questionnaire
primarily as a challenge and secondarily as a research medium
proved successful because participants were eager to test
themselves on a real-world skill that is becoming increasingly
important. As a result, our advertisement gained reputation
quickly by being up-voted and shared within a variety of social
media platforms, resulting in a substantial sample size that
allows meaningful statistical analysis (4,333 responses). Our
sample included participants across a broad range of online
platforms, as well as technical and non-technical environments
from within our university’s undergraduate population. Also,
in many studies in this area, the real nature of the study is
initially hidden from the participants, so that the strength of a
deception attempt is not weakened by suspicion. Here, instead
we use the participants as human binary classifiers of exhibits
into attack versus non-attack. In this manner, we can reveal the
nature of the study from the beginning, which addresses key
technical and ethical challenges associated with temporarily
deceiving the participants.
2) Experiment 2: In the second experiment, a controlled re-
cruitment policy was employed in order to achieve a balanced
sample of participants who had received some security training
and were technology savvy and generic online users with
little or no training. New undergraduate and research students
were invited to participate in the experiment if they were
studying a computer security program and the professional
service Qualtrics Panels was used to recruit participants from a
wider, more generic population demographic. Specifically, par-
ticipants from the US ranging between the ages ranging from
18-65, both female and male, were defined as the participant
selection criteria. No specific technology or security training
attributes were defined in the Qualtrics Panel recruitment.
Figures 2 and 3 shows the geographical distribution of the
participants for both experiments.
Fig. 5: Experiment 1: Exhibit 11 (screenshot) - “Qrishing”
attack leading to Steam phishing site
B. Experiment Design
The survey portion of the experiment required participants
to answer a series of questions related to age, gender, general
education, security training (S), platform familiarity (FA),
frequency (FR) and duration of access (DR), computer literacy
(CL) and security awareness (SA):
Security Training (S): Formal computer security education
(S1), work-based computer security training (S2) and self-
study computer security training (S3), each coded as a binary
response: Yes (1), No (0). In relation to the terminology
used in [47], we directly map formal education as “Formal
Learning”, work-based training as “Non-formal learning”, and
self-study as “Informal learning”.
Familiarity (FA): We use FA for familiarity with a particular
provider’s platform (e.g., GMAIL), coded as: Not very familiar
(1), Somewhat familiar (2), Very familiar (3).
6Fig. 6: Experiment 2: Exhibit 11 (Video) - “Typosquatting”
attack on Microsoft Edge browser leading to an attack website
with a malicious update prompt for Google Chrome browser
Frequency (FR): For each platform category presented in
the susceptibility test, coded as: Never (1), less than once a
month (2), once a month (3), weekly (4), daily (5).
Duration (DR): For each platform category presented in the
susceptibility test, coded: None (1), less than 30 mins (2), 30
mins to 1 hour (3), 1 to 2 hours (4), 2-4 hours (5), 4 hours+
(6).
Computer Literacy (CL): Self-reported level of computer
literacy using a 0-100 scale.
Security Awareness (SA): Self-reported level of security
awareness using a 0-100 scale.
Each experiment included a series of 12 exhibits (6 attacks
and 6 non-attacks), each containing a concise scenario fol-
lowed by an exhibit, consisting of one or more screenshots,
GIF animations or videos. For each, participants were asked
to examine the exhibit and provide a binary response to
categorise each one as: “Most likely an attack” or “Most likely
not an attack”. In our analysis, correct responses were coded
as 1 and incorrect ones as 0.
To determine general indicators of susceptibility, the attack
exhibits chosen spanned a range of semantic social engineering
attacks across different platforms. We have developed each
semantic attack according to the three different types of
deception vectors of the semantic social engineering taxonomy
in [1]. In accordance with this, deception vector refers to
the mechanism by which the participant is deceived into
facilitating a security breach. It can be cosmetic (DV1), where
the semantic attack is visually convincing, but does not nec-
essarily conform to expected platform behaviour; behaviour-
based (DV2), where the attack behaves in a manner that
is expected or accepted within platform convention, but is
not visually convincing; and both cosmetic and behaviour-
based (DV3), where the attack needs to be both visually and
behaviourally convincing to deceive the user.
A breakdown of the 24 exhibits developed for the two ex-
periments is presented in Table II, along with the participants’
average score in each exhibit. The average score can serve as
an indication of the difficulty of each exhibit. To illustrate the
style of the presentation of the exhibits to the participants, we
have also included three indicative examples of attack exhibits
(Figures 5, 4 and 6, which correspond to exhibits Exp1.11,
Exp1.5 and Exp2.11 respectively). For presentation purposes
here, we have added red outlines to represent visual attack
indicators in the exhibit. These outlines were obviously not
visible to the participants.
C. Overall participant performance results
To determine overall accuracy and precision, we follow
the approach defined in signal detection theory [48], [49],
which is geared towards analysing data generated from human
experiments, where the task is to categorise participants’
responses generated by a known process or by chance. This
approach is common in analysing experiments that involve
semantic attacks, such as phishing [33]. In the standard for-
mulas used below, for exhibit k ∈ [1,K], Tp,k is the number
of true positives (i.e., correctly identified as attack), Tn,k is
the number of true negatives (i.e., correctly identified as non-
attack), Fp,k is the number of false positives (i.e., incorrectly
identified as attack), and Fn,k is number of false negatives (i.e.,
incorrectly identified as non-attack). Note that in this case,
K = 12, and by accuracy and precision, we are referring
to the average accuracy and average precision across all 12
exhibits.
Accuracy =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Tp,k + Tn,k
Tp,k + Tn,k + Fp,k + Fn,k
(1)
Precision =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Tp,k
Tp,k + Fp,k
(2)
To facilitate the analysis of the participants’ responses, we
developed an equal number of attack and non-attack exhibits
for each platform category used in the experiment. In this
section, our aim is to simply evaluate the overall performance
of the users in our samples as human classifiers of the given
exhibits. We also note the performance of individual groups
that are commonly studied in this space, including groups by
country, age and gender. We derive the country based on the
IP of the participant, assuming that there is no strong reason
to believe that several participants would have spoofed their
IP while taking part in this experiment. Also, age and gender
are self-reported. Again, we do not have any strong reason to
believe that several participants would provide false details in
this case.
Table III summarises the performance of users from dif-
ferent countries, which we observe to be almost identical
across the world, with mean accuracy of 0.74 (with variance of
0.0002) and mean precision of 0.77 (with variance of 0.0002).
For this reason, we did not consider the geographical factor in
the second experiment. Also, this is advantageous when devel-
oping a prediction model to be applied across all populations.
Table IV summarises the performance of participants of ex-
periments 1 and 2 based on age and gender. Here, we observe
slightly more pronounced performance differences between
the different groups. For example, we can see that female
7Experiment 1
ID Perf. SA Platform Type Provider Platform DV Exhibit Description
E1 0.72 N Social Media GoogleApps - Screenshot Facebook app down from GoogleApps with app permissions
E2 0.63 N Email Gmail - Screenshot Failed login report from Google for this email account based on location
E3 0.67 Y Public WiFi Starbucks WiFi DV3 Screenshot Evil Twin WiFi attack, fake SSID and web portal with private IP, login request email credentials
E4 0.76 N Social Media Facebook - Screenshot Mistyped Facebook URL “Facebok” redirects to real Facebook website
E5 0.88 Y Social Media Facebook DV2 Screenshot “Clickbait” app shared by friend on user timeline; requests permissions and redirects
E6 0.67 Y Email Gmail DV1 Screenshot Spearphishing Twitter email responding to bogus functionality, with button to login
E7 0.88 Y Social Media Twitter DV3 Screenshot Twitter phishing website spoofing Twitter website real homepage, URL “http://twitteri.com”
E8 0.78 N Public WiFi BT WiFi Hotspot - Screenshot BT FON public WiFi hotspot SSID (multiple found in area), login portal, secured with HTTPS
E9 0.67 Y Email Gmail DV1 Screenshot Email confirming Paypal purchase with link to “dispute transcation”
E10 0.72 N Email Outlook - Screenshot Paypal email requesting activation via URL link. Approved sender address icon supplied
E11 0.86 Y Social Media Steam DV3 Screenshot QRishing attack (malicious QR code) on fake Steam social media account redirecting to fake website login
E12 0.64 N Social Media Twitter - Screenshot Embedded game advert in Twitter app on mobile; shows app rating and downloads
Experiment 2
ID Perf. SA Platform Type Provider Platform DV Exhibit Description
E1 0.78 Y Social Media Facebook DV1 GIF Video masquerading acting a “clickbait” link to bogus survey designed to steal user credentials
E2 0.55 Y IM Steam DV2 Screenshot Phishing instant message containing URL link
E3 0.83 N Social Media Facebook - Screenshot Facebook app update on mobile device with permissions request
E4 0.75 N Public WiFi Starbucks - Screenshot Starbucks / AT&T login capture portal, URL generated by AT &T web proxy
E5 0.80 N Web browser Android DV3 Screenshot Fake virus scan pop-up downloading Android scareware requiring purchase to remove infections
E6 0.91 Y Social Media Youtube - Screenshot Youtube blocked video due to location settings and copyright
E7 0.55 N Email Gmail DV1 Video Phishing email from Natwest Bank containing a URL link
E8 0.79 Y Social Media Facebook - Video Application permissions request to add game to Facebook profile (Desktop version)
E9 0.86 N Social Media Twitter - Video Twitter account confirmation on website; email from Twitter requesting confirmation via link
E10 0.46 N Social Media Twitter - Video Comodo email with link to encryption certificate; link broken due to timeout of download
E11 0.61 Y Web Browser MS Edge DV2 Video ”Faceb00k.com” typosquatting redirecting to webpage warning user to install fake Chrome patch
E12 0.36 Y E-commerce Gumtree DV3 Video Phishing email redirecting to phishing Gumtree login; once entered redirects to real website
TABLE II: Brief description of the 24 exhibits developed for the two experiments. The overall score (percentage of correct
answers) of the participants for each exhibit is an indication of its difficulty. SA refers to the existence or not of a semantic
attack in each exhibit (Y/N). For the exhibits where there was an attack, DV is the deception vector (DV1: cosmetic; DV2:
behaviour-based; DV3: both cosmetic and behaviour-based).
participants were less accurate and less precise (68%, 67%)
than male participants (74%, 77%), which is in accordance
with most of the related literature ( [32], [33] and [34]). We
also observe that accuracy and precision are fairly consistent
between the ages of 18 and 44, but drop in the 45+ age
groups. Overall, the performance of the samples of participants
in both experiments is largely coherent and consistent. The
sample sizes of the groups that performed slightly worse in
both experiments were relatively low. Moreover, they represent
protected personal characteristics, and are thus impractical for
our purposes. As we aim to develop prediction models suitable
for use in a technical system, age and gender need to be
omitted as candidate predictors because they do not satisfy the
ethical criterion that we have set. For example, an organisation
implementing security controls that are stricter or less strict
based on age or gender would be seen as discriminatory.
Overall, the reported performance of the participants provides
no strong indication that omitting these demographic variables
(geography, gender, age) would have a major impact on the
chosen predictor features’ accuracy and precision.
Perf. US UK Canada Germany Australia Netherlands Brazil Other
Acc. 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.72 0.76
Prec. 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.80
Sample 1863 454 293 207 161 107 138 1234
TABLE III: Experiment 1 participant performance by country
Experiment Perf. Overall 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ Male Female
1
Acc. 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.74 0.68
Prec. 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.67
Sample 4333 2936 1074 190 68 65 3879 456
2
Acc. 0.65 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.57 0.59 0.71 0.59
Prec. 0.57 0.67 0.58 0.53 0.33 0.55 0.64 0.39
Sample 315 95 104 65 27 29 232 85
TABLE IV: Experiment 1 and 2 participant performance by
age and gender
IV. STAGE 1: ASSOCIATION RULE MINING ON THE
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1
While performing prediction based on the large dataset
collected in experiment 1 would be an attractive prospect,
in practice, the high-level features used (described in Section
II-B) would not be granular enough. Our attempts to produce
prediction models solely based on them produced relatively
low accuracy rates, just above the null rate for each exhibit.
Instead, the primary objective of experiment 1 was to use it as
a mechanism to determine which features should be explored
further. For this purpose, we have performed association rule
mining (ARM). ARM is a standard data mining methodology
successfully employed in network intrusion detection [50],
bioinformatics [51], recommender systems [52], social net-
work advertising [53] and several other applications. It can
help identify frequent itemsets (collections of attributes that
frequently occur together) and association rules to determine
whether strong relationships exist between two or more items.
8As brief introduction to ARM, an association rule is com-
posed of an itemset, which comprises an antecedent, consisting
of one or more attributes and forming the “IF” of a rule,
and a consequent, which forms the “THEN”. The percentage
of cases of an item’s existence amongst frequent itemsets is
referred to as support, while the conditional probability of
observing a particular exhibit response under the condition that
the participant attributes contain a particular set of participant
attributes is referred to as confidence. Here, we employ the
apriori algorithm [54] to create association rules by comparing
frequent itemsets to a specified support/confidence threshold
that determines the strength of the rule.
Using the Arules package in R [55], we have conducted
frequent itemset discovery and association rule generation
configuring a threshold for support larger than the system
default and the default threshold for confidence, which are
0.15 and 0.8 respectively. For each association rule, we
evaluate its importance using five commonly used metrics:
support/confidence as the primary interest measure for each
rule, as well as lift, coverage and odds ratio of each rule
as individual measures of independence. For each metric’s
formula below, X refers to the frequent itemset attribute(s)
that consist of the participant indicators defined in section
III-B, forming the rule antecedent(s). The rules consequent
Y defines a correct response to an attack exhibit, coded as
RESPONSE=1 (i.e., for participants who classified particular
exhibit correctly). In summary:
Support: supp(X ⇒ Y ) = P (X ∪ Y ) (3)
Confidence: conf(X ⇒ Y ) = P (X ∪ Y )
P (X)
(4)
Lift: lift(X ⇒ Y ) = P (X ∪ Y )
P (X)P (Y )
(5)
Coverage: cover(X ⇒ Y ) = P (X) (6)
Odds Ratio: α(X ⇒ Y ) = P (X)/1− P (X))
P (Y )/1− P (Y ) (7)
Note that on investigation, no rules were reported for
RESPONSE=0 (i.e., for participants who classified particular
exhibit incorrectly) to satisfy the support/confidence threshold
0.15/0.8. This indicates that within the data there exists a high
degree of variability between participants who were suscep-
tible and no distinguishable pattern between their attributes
could be determined.
For lift, a value of 1.0 indicates independence of X and Y ,
while values greater than 1.0 indicate that participants with
attributes X contain more correct attack exhibit responses Y
(i.e., RESPONSE=1), than those without these attributes. An
Odds Ratio of 1 indicates that Y is not associated to X, which
is to say that an exhibit response is not related to the participant
attributes.
Using the apriori algorithm, a total of 24 association rules
were initially identified. These were then pruned by removing
super rules of any other rule that has the same or higher lift.
Pruning resulted in reduction from 24 to 10 association rules.
In Figure 7, the 10 association rules are shown where
each item and vertex indicates the formation of a rule, where
Fig. 7: Association Rules graph with items and rules as
vertices. The size of each circle linking vertices relates to the
support of a rule, while the colour indicates the lift.
vertices leading to “RESPONSE=1” show the consequent of
the rule. The size of each circle linking vertices is related to
the support of a rule, while the colour indicates the lift. In
Table V, the importance measure of each rule is summarised,
in order of confidence, lift and odds ratio (OR).
Rules Support Confidence Lift Coverage OR
S3=1,FR=5,FA=3 0.15 0.85 1.1 0.181 1.82
CL=100,S3=1 0.15 0.84 1.091 0.181 1.71
S3=1,FA=3 0.21 0.84 1.091 0.248 1.78
FR=5,FA=3 0.21 0.83 1.083 0.247 1.69
CL=100 0.18 0.83 1.08 0.212 1.62
FA=3 0.28 0.83 1.075 0.34 1.69
S2=1,S3=1 0.16 0.83 1.073 0.193 1.53
S2=1 0.18 0.82 1.059 0.224 1.42
S3=1,FR=5 0.3 0.81 1.049 0.366 1.42
S1=1,S3=1 0.2 0.8 1.04 0.252 1.27
TABLE V: Pruned Association Rules reported for participants
with correct exhibit response
The association rule with the highest lift indicates that
participants who had had security training through self study
and also used the type of platform shown in the exhibit
daily and were very familiar with the exhibit platform itself
were highly likely to correctly identify a semantic attack
on this platform. In other words, the rule antecedent “S3=1,
FR=5, FA=3” was reported by 18% of the total participants
in the survey, where 15% of the total participants who also
reported these attributes correctly identified a semantic attack
“RESPONSE=1”; resulting in a 85% confidence that these
9participants were not susceptible. Of course, this was expected.
In respect to odds ratio, participants with these attributes were
82% less likely to be susceptible to a semantic attack. Here,
a lift value of 1.1 means that the participants who were
not susceptible (RESPONSE=1), who have security training
through self-study, use the target platform type daily and are
very familiar with the specific platform, are observed 10%
more than the percentage of the participants that were not
susceptible in the total participant dataset. Within the 10
pruned rules, the appearance of frequently occurring items
provides insight into association between specific attributes
and reduced susceptibility to attacks. For example, familiarity
with the specific platform provider (FA), frequency of access
with a particular type of platform (FR), self-study (S3) and
computer literacy (CL) are consistently reported attributes. On
the contrary, duration of access (DR) and security awareness
(SA) do not appear in the rules at the support/confidence
threshold. Overall, the association rules indicate that security
training through self-study, daily access to a type of platform
and familiarity with a specific platform in this type category,
as well high confidence with computer literacy are associated
to reduced susceptibility to semantic attacks. However, given
the minor variations in lift between these rules, the lack of
100% confidence in any rule and relatively low support, a large
proportion of non-susceptible users without these attributes
may not be represented. Therefore, employing these rules
as classification criteria would likely result in susceptibility
prediction that produces many false negatives. Instead, we
utilise these findings to identify the attributes that we should
study in greater detail in stage 2 of our analysis, as presented
in Section V.
V. STAGE 2: EXPERIMENT 2 MODEL AND FEATURE
SELECTION
Following on from the initial investigation of each high-
level feature studied in experiment 1, experiment 2 was con-
ducted on a smaller participant base (315 respondents), where
participants were tested on a new set of semantic attacks,
consisting of screenshots, animations and videos, and were
asked to provide considerably more detail on their profile.
In experiment 2, we add further granularity to the high-level
features identified in the ten ARM rules of Section IV. In
detail, we extend FR and FA to include both specific provider
platforms (FR1, FA1) in combination with types of platform
(FR2, FA2). Also, we adapt and extend security training as
follows: S1, S2 and S3 are converted from a binary answer to
a length of time since last training for S1, S2 and S3, with a
scale of: Never, over 1 year, up to 1 year, up to 6 months, up
to 3 months, up to 1 month, up to 2 weeks. The second mea-
sures security training by platform types and specific provider
platforms, including length of time since last training. Each
high-level security category is also extended to include the
training methods commonly used for each respective security
category, such as: self study (S3) through online videos, formal
education (S1) through coursework, etc. Features SA and CL
are not altered. In order to identify whether features DR and
SA are truly non-informative, redundant features, we include
them in the model feature selection process alongside the
newly expanded, granular feature-set; extending DR to specific
provider platforms (DR1 - platform type, DR2 - platform
provider). As a result of expanding and adapting the feature-
set, we increase from 8 candidate predictors in experiment 1
to 22 in experiment 2, as summarised in Table VI.
With the adapted feature-set from experiment 2, using R
[55] and the Caret package [56], we identify machine learning
models that can predict a user’s ability to detect attacks.
Firstly, we select and compare two distinct machine learning
algorithms; modelling both a linear and non-linear approach
to prediction. Secondly, for each model we have applied
automatic feature selection with sequential backward selection
in Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE); obtaining an optimal
model for each machine learning algorithm.
1) Logistic Regression Vs. Random Forest: For a user
susceptibility model to be practically usable by a technical
security system, it must employ predictor features that can be
practically measured in real-time, automatically and ethically.
To evaluate whether a linear model can be sufficient, we
first employ logistic regression (LR), which performs well
in linear spaces, functioning by definition as a special case
generalised linear model using a Bernoulli distribution for a
binary response [57]. LR is relatively robust to noisy data and
over-fitted models, where the data contains high variance. In
comparison to LR, another method that is resilient to variance
in model predictions is a method known as bagging (also
known as Bootstrap Aggregating [58]), where the algorithm
produces replicates of the original data sample by creating
new datasets by random selection with replacement. With each
dataset, multiple new models are constructed and gathered to
form an ensemble of models. Within the prediction process,
all of the models in the ensemble are polled and the results are
averaged to produce a result. Random forest (RF) is a popular
bagging algorithm that can also be described as an ensemble
decision tree classifier. In RF, a number of decision trees
are trained with different re-sampled versions of an original
dataset and then used to predict data that was omitted from
each sample as an embedded measure of training accuracy;
this is called the out-of-bag error. Here, RF reduces the high
variance inherent in a decision single tree by creating n
trees that are averaged to reduce the variance of the final
model [59]. Unlike LR, RF handles nonlinearity naturally.
Predictor variables are randomly chosen at each decision split
in the decision tree which results in a randomised, non-linear
approach.
2) Recursive Feature Elimination: Employing the predictor
features summarised in Table VI, for both LR and RF models,
we have used an automatic feature selection method to identify
the most informative predictor features and build a single
prediction model for each individual attack exhibit. Recursive
Feature Elimination (RFE) is an automatic backwards feature
selection algorithm. It starts by fitting a model to all 22
features, ranking the latter based on their variable importance
to the model, and gradually excluding the features with the
lowest importance in each iteration, recursively considering
smaller and smaller feature sets. In RF, variable importance
is calculated within the model by recording the out-of-bag
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Feature Description Scale
FA1 Familiarity with provider platform Not very familiar (1), Somewhat familiar (2), Very familiar (3)
FR1 Frequency of use for provider platform Never (1), less than once a month (2), once a month (3), weekly (4), daily (5)
DR1 Duration of use for provider platform None (1), < 30 min (2), 30 min to 1 h (3), 1-2 h (4), 2-4 h (5), >4 h (6)
ST1 Time since training for provider platform Never (0), > 1 year (1), 6 months to 1 year (2), 3 to 6 months (3), 1 to 3 months (4), 2 weeks to 1 month (5), < 2 weeks (6)
FA2 Familiarity with platform type Not very familiar (1), Somewhat familiar (2), Very familiar (3)
FR2 Frequency of use for platform type Never (1), less than once a month (2), once a month (3), weekly (4), daily (5)
DR2 Duration of use for platform type None (1), < 30 min (2), 30 min to 1 h (3), 1-2 h (4), 2-4 h (5), >4 h (6)
ST2 Time since training for platform type Never (0), > 1 year (1), 6 months to 1 year (2), 3 to 6 months (3), 1 to 3 months (4), 2 weeks to 1 month (5), < 2 weeks (6)
S1 1 Formal Education through lectures No (0), Yes (1)
S1 2 Formal Education through tests No (0), Yes (1)
S1 3 Formal Education through coursework No (0), Yes (1)
S1T Time since formal education Never (0), > 1 year (1), 6 months to 1 year (2), 3 to 6 months (3), 1 to 3 months (4), 2 weeks to 1 month (5), < 2 weeks (6)
S2 1 Work-based through tests No (0), Yes (1)
S2 2 Work-based through videos No (0), Yes (1)
S2 3 Work-based through games No (0), Yes (1)
S2T Time since work-based training Never (0), > 1 year (1), 6 months to 1 year (2), 3 to 6 months (3), 1 to 3 months (4), 2 weeks to 1 month (5), < 2 weeks (6)
S3 1 Self-study through websites No (0), Yes (1)
S3 2 Self-study through videos No (0), Yes (1)
S3 3 Self-study through games No (0), Yes (1)
S3T Time since self-study training Never (0), > 1 year (1), 6 months to 1 year (2), 3 to 6 months (3), 1 to 3 months (4), 2 weeks to 1 month (5), < 2 weeks (6)
TABLE VI: Predictor variables utilised in Experiment 2
Exhibits FR1 FR2 FA1 FA2 DR1 DR2 ST1 ST2 SA CL S3T S2T S1T S3 1 S3 2 S3 3 S2 1 S2 2 S2 3 S1 1 S1 2 S1 3
E1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
E2 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
E5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
E7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
E11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
E12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total 5 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 3 2 4 1 4 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
TABLE VII: Total number of times each predictor feature is selected for an attack exhibit’s best performing model
prediction accuracy for every predictor variable permutation in
each decision tree. At each feature iteration, model accuracy
is compared between the prior and permuted model, averaged
over all trees and then normalised by the standard error. Since
LR has no model-specific method to estimate importance,
the Caret package conducts receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve analysis on each feature iteration by evaluating
the area under the ROC curve (AUROC), which is used as the
variable importance for LR [60]. A ROC curve illustrates the
performance of a binary classifier at different prediction proba-
bilities by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false
positive rate (FPR) at various thresholds. AUROC represents
the area under the ROC curve, where a random guess area of
0.5 (0,0 to 1,1) is typically used as the reference area from
which to evaluate model performance. The result of LR is the
selection of those features that have a statistically significant
impact on the probability of a user’s correct prediction.
One possible drawback of RFE is the potential for over-
fitting to predictor variables, as the procedure can focus on
nuances in the sample data that may be anomalous and
therefore not present in future data. For example, where
predictors randomly correlate with the dependent variable
being predicted, RFE may assign a good importance ranking to
these variables, even if they were to make no practical sense.
During training, this would indeed lower prediction error, but
when validating the model on new data it might reveal that
the predictors are actually non-informative, in a case referred
to as “selection bias” [61]. To avoid this problem, and as is
standard practice in supervised machine learning experiments
and models, we have employed an outer layer of resampling
through a repeated 10-fold cross-validation to provide a robust
estimate of model feature-selection and test error as evaluated
by RFE. Cross-validation (CV) is a model validation technique
for assessing model performance on unseen, independent data
sets and is an important tool for avoiding exaggerated model
accuracy results (e.g. over-fitting a model by testing it on the
same data the model has been trained on). In the 10-fold CV
process, the data sample is partitioned into 10 equal folds,
where nine folds are used to train the model and the remaining
one fold is used to test it. This process is repeated 10 times
so that the model is tested on each fold in order to produce
an average model test error, which in our case reports model
test error at each variable selection step in RFEs backwards
selection process. With repeated 10-fold CV, for each 10-fold
training process, the process is repeated another 10 times.
In Figure 8, we present the results of LR and RF CV
test error for each attack and the optimal set of predictors
selected by RFE. We compare LR and RF with each other, as
well as with a naive classifier, which, for each exhibit would
always select the answer (0 or 1) that is the most common
in the sampled population (the sample response rate). This
is the maximum accuracy of a model that uses no features
for predicting the sample population outcome. For five out of
six attack exhibits, both LR and RF models reported superior
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Fig. 8: Each graph presents the results of 10 times repeated 10-fold cross-validation for each exhibit, using recursive feature
elimination with a LR and a RF model. Results are presented in the form of overall test accuracy
classification accuracy than the sample response rate. RF
outperformed LR in four of the six attack exhibits.
Table VII shows where each feature was selected for an
exhibit’s final prediction model (whether it was the LR or
the RF model that was best performing). We observe that
frequency of access to the specific provider platform in the
exhibit (FR1) was included in the best performing prediction
model for 5 out of 6 exhibits, followed by length of time since
security training through self-study and formal education,
which appeared in 4 out of 6 exhibits’ final models.
On the other end, familiarity with the exhibit platform type,
security training with a particular platform type, security self-
study through games, work-based through tests and formal
education through lectures were not selected for any exhibit’s
final prediction model. Removing these five features, we prune
the candidate-feature set from 22 to 17 within a final RFE
model selection process process with the aim to build a
final model for susceptibility prediction. In order to build
a prediction model that can potentially be employed across
any platform and with any semantic attack, we combine
each of the exhibits’ sample responses into a stacked data
sample, where all users’ responses are included in a single
dataset for all attacks. So, the values for each feature relate
to the particular attack’s settings in a particular entry in the
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dataset. For instance, the feature “familiarity with platform
type” in an attack that utilises Facebook would refer to
the familiarity with platform of type “social network”. This
approach enables the construction of a single model that
contains a range of semantic attacks, platform types and
specific provider platforms. Creating a single model for each
attack would be impractical, as we would need one model
for each platform/attack combination. Training a model based
on a wide-range of disparate platforms and attacks, and using
a combined dataset for a single prediction response, enables
more widely applicable prediction of susceptibility that can be
utilised in a technical security system.
A. Susceptibility Model: Results and Analysis
A reliable and widely applicable user susceptibility model
can have several applications as part of a defence mechanism
against semantic attacks. It can help predict a specific user’s
a) degree of “susceptibility” to semantic attacks (likelihood of
being deceived by one), or equivalently b) expected perfor-
mance if they were to act as a human classifier (likelihood
of spotting attacks). The former can help a security system
identify whether a user is particularly susceptible to semantic
attacks and consequently whether the system environment
needs to adapt accordingly (e.g., by privilege adjustment,
targeted warnings, security enforcing functionality, etc.). The
latter can help evaluate to what extent a user can be relied
upon as a “Human as a Security Sensor” (HaaSS) of semantic
attacks, where user reports are taken into account so as to
strengthen an organisation’s cyber situational awareness.
For both applications, it is important to measure the model’s
performance based on its general accuracy in predicting which
participants will detect the attacks and which will not, and
secondly its ability to reduce false positives or false negatives
by using a probability cut-off threshold. Table VIII compares
the LR and RF classifiers’ overall performance against the
naive classifier, which always selects the answer with the
highest probability in the population sample (so, always 0 if
population’s success rate is below 50% and always 1 other-
wise, for a given exhibit). The test split used for classification
consisted of 215 correct (1) and 147 incorrect (0) responses. In
Table X, the predictors selected by the RFE process for the LR
and RF models are presented. For the RF model, to evaluate
feature variable importance, as metric, we use the reduction
in out-of-bag error during the model training process. For the
LR model, we use the increase in AUROC.
Classifier Accuracy Precision FN FP P value Features
LR 0.68 0.70 0.12 0.20 <0.001 7
RF 0.71 0.73 0.12 0.18 <0.001 16
Naive 0.59 0.59 0 0.41 0.5 0
TABLE VIII: Prediction performance comparing the accuracy,
precision, false positive and false negative detection of the final
LR and RF models against the Naive classifier
B. Key observations
Both the LR and RF models satisfy the statistical sig-
nificance threshold of 0.05 and both appear to outperform
Features Intercept FR1 CL S3T S2 2 DR2 S1T S3 1
OR 0.20 1.22 1.01 1.10 0.57 1.13 1.06 1.29
TABLE IX: Feature Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression
Model
comfortably the naive classifier, which is a good sign in terms
of their practical applicability. There is a slight advantage of
RF over LR across all metrics (higher accuracy and precision,
and lower false positives), but this comes at the expense of
practicality, because it requires a large number of features
to be monitored (16 against LR’s only 7). Moreover, as RF
employs a black box modelling approach, this makes it less
interpretable than the LR model as to why each feature within
the model informs prediction. In LR, interpretation is more
straightforward, because it produces each feature’s odds ratio
(OR), which is the increase in the probability of a user
correctly identifying an attack for every one unit increase in
that feature’s scale, when all other features remain fixed. For
example, from table IX, we see that a unit increase in the
scale of frequency of use (e.g., from once a month to weekly),
increases the probability of correct detection by 22%. So, ORs
can also be used to cross-reference with variable importance in
interpreting each feature’s influence to the prediction outcome.
As one would have expected, security training does make
a difference, with all three forms (formal education, work-
based training and self-study) appearing in some form in both
models. In general, we observe that the length of time since
last training (whether self-study, formal education or work-
based training) is particularly important, with time since last
self-study (S3T) appearing to be overall the most important
in the training category. This is reasonable, because semantic
attacks evolve continuously and any guidelines or technical
information learned in training needs to be updated often.
Five years ago, semantic attacks were almost entirely based
on generic phishing and ransomware. Today, watering holes,
WiFi evil twins and socia media friend injection attacks have
become the norm, and phishing has expanded to all forms of
user interaction, from Quick Response (QR) codes, to near-
field communication (NFC) and Bluetooth [1]. Interestingly,
formal security education through lectures was not chosen as
a useful predictor of susceptibility to semantic attacks by any
of the models and for any of the exhibits.
Frequency of access to the specific provider’s platform
(FR1) rather than generally to the type of platform (e.g.,
specifically Facebook rather than generally social networks)
was shown to reduce susceptibility noticeably, being the fourth
most important variable in RF and the first in LR. Frequency
of access to the general type of platform (FR2) was utilised by
RF as one of the features with the lowest variable importance
(0.06), and was not utilised at all by LR.
Duration of access to the same platform type was important
in both models, with 13% increase in the probability for each
unit increase in the LR odds ratio. In RF, frequency and
duration was also important for the platform type. Also, in
the RF model familiarity with the platform provider was the
fifth highest important variable.
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Fig. 9: RF (left) and LR (right) model performance for false positive (not susceptible), false negative (susceptible) prediction
and overall prediction accuracy at each probability cutoff
Model Selected Features
Random Forest CL (0.114), S3T (0.112), SA (0.107), FR1 (0.099), FA1 (0.097), S3 1 (0.087), S1T (0.073), S2T (0.073), S2 2 (0.068),
FR2 (0.06), DR1 (0.05), S2 3 (0.048), S3 2 (0.048), DR2 (0.046), ST2 (0.039), S1 3 (0.033)
Logistic Regression FR1 (0.035), CL (0.032), S3T (0.029), S2 2 (0.027), DR2 (0.023), S1T (0.021), S3 1 (0.018)
TABLE X: RF and LR model predictor features selected through recursive feature selection (in order of variable importance
measure: decrease in out of bag error rate for RF, and increase in AUROC for LR). The higher the variable importance (in
brackets), the more important the feature is to its model.
Computer literacy (CL) was shown to be the most important
feature for RF and the second most important for LR. This
reinforces the need for a mechanism to monitor and record
computer literacy as a gauge of an organisation’s cyber risk.
Unlike the high level predictors Security Awareness (SA)
and Duration of Access (DR), which were not included in the
association rules in experiment 1, the RF model included both
Security Awareness and the expanded DR features: duration
of using a specific platform provider (DR1) and specific
platform type (DR2), whereas the LR model included DR1
only. Surprisingly, in RF, SA was the third most important
feature, whereas in LR it was not included at all; as per
the association rules. On the other hand, more in line with
the association rules omitting DR in experiment 1, both DR1
and DR2 were were given relatively low variable importance
in RF, placing 11th and 15th out of the total 17 features,
respectively, with DR2 placing 5th out of a total 7 features
for LR and DR1 omitted from the models feature-set. For
both models, SA, DR1 and DR2 were given a lower degree of
variable importance than all other features that were expanded
from their higher level counterparts (FR, FA, CL, S3, S2,
S1) reported in experiment 1’s association rules frequent item
sets; with the exception of time since last security training
through formal education (S1T), which slightly less important
than DR2 (0.21 compared to 0.23) in the LR model. The
indication is that the original high level predictors show a
consistent association with reduced susceptibility across both
experiments, even after adding further granularity to their
measurement scale and context, and as a result also gained
sufficient predictive power for determining the probability
of a participants susceptibility to semantic attacks with a
reasonable degree of accuracy.
There is no doubt that a user’s susceptibility to semantic
social engineering attacks depends also on personality traits,
social context, psychological state and other human and con-
textual factors, which are, however, impractical, as they cannot
be measured in real-time, automatically or ethically. Without
knowledge regarding these factors, one cannot expect a highly
accurate prediction of susceptibility. So, the accuracy improve-
ment of around 10% against the naive classifier achieved here
is significant. In practice, we have developed this method to act
as a baseline for an organisation’s technical security system,
which can then adapt over time, as it learns the characteristics
of the organisation’s own users.
Equally significant is that one can utilise these models to
identify an appropriate probability threshold depending on
preference in minimising false positives, minimising false
negatives or maximising accuracy (Figure 9). By probability
threshold, we refer to the value over which a technical se-
curity system should consider a user to be susceptible to a
semantic attack. For instance, if the aim were to maximise
accuracy, the probability threshold for determining whether
a user is susceptible or not, should be 0.5 for both models.
However, it would be 0.55 if the aim were to keep both
false positives and false negatives below 0.2. Overall, RF
appears to perform slightly better than LR in terms of false
positives at low probability thresholds, but is slightly worse at
higher probability thresholds. For false negatives, the reverse is
observed. In an organisation that is tolerant of false positives,
but not tolerant of false negatives, to keep the false negatives
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below 0.02, both LR and RF models would yield a false
positive rate just under 0.4. For RF, this would correspond
to a probability cut-off of 0.15, and for LR to a cut-off of 0.3.
For an organisation that is tolerant of false negatives, false
positives can be effectively avoided using the RF model at a
0.85 cutoff, but this results in an approximate 20% decrease
in overall classification accuracy, with the number of false
negatives increasing to 0.48.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Limitations
In our exhibit-based experiment there are a few limitations
that must be considered. Participants were primed to the
purpose of the survey and subsequent test and thus may
have been more vigilant and sensitive to a semantic attack’s
deception (therefore weakening its effect) than they would
have normally been.
For the first experiment, the simple approach of using
screenshots to represent the exhibits was very useful in
conducting a large-scale study online and on any computer
platform. However, the use of screenshots is more appropriate
for DV1 attacks that rely on cosmetic deception than for
DV2 (and partially DV3) that rely on behavioural deception,
which is less straightforward to convey via screenshots. To
address this, in the second experiment we included video
exhibits where behavioural deception can be more accurately
emulated (in terms of context and system behaviour), rather
than depicted visually.
Potential limitations may also exist in the selection of
features for our susceptibility model. We have focused on
a number of high-level concepts with the aim to create a
model for predicting susceptibility that is applicable across
a wide range of semantic attacks. One example is computer
security training where we focus on the type and mode of
delivery of security training rather than its content. Prediction
taking into account the content too would have probably been
more accurate, but would presume that an organisation can
collect such detailed information for its users, which may be
impractical.
B. Challenges in producing datasets for semantic social en-
gineering susceptibility prediction
Real-world, authoritative datasets for user susceptibility
to semantic attacks are not available. An organisation may
not publicly reveal that their business has been exploited
because of the perceived reputational damage it could cause
or simply because employees fail to report breaches for fear
of disciplinary actions. Security authorities and organisations,
such as Semantec [62], who actively publish data from those
businesses, and users who do report attacks tend to anonymise
and censor the data to a point that profiling information that
could show context leading to an attack is removed before
being made publicly accessible. Therefore, development of
user datasets through research experiments is necessary to
understand which behaviours and identifying factors help
determine susceptibility and thus inform the design and devel-
opment of new security mechanisms against semantic attacks.
In this section, we identify a number of persisting problems
for the development of robust semantic attacks datasets:
• Ethics. A prevalent limitation for access to user suscep-
tibility data is ethics. Ethical consideration and approval
can be a barrier to the collection of rich user data for
aiding researchers and developers in the development
of user-centric defences against semantic attacks. Exper-
iments with human participant require ethics approval
from an institutional of governmental review board, and
therefore there are often a number of requisite require-
ments which limit researchers ability to produce truly
representative results. For example, in [63], participant
deception and debriefing, privacy and institute review
board approval were determined to be the main chal-
lenges that affect the design and execution of phishing
experiments. Mouton et al [64] proposes a normative
perspective for ethics in social engineering which can
help ethics committees in the process of experiment ap-
proval. Here, reporting susceptibility would be considered
from a utilitarian and deontogical standpoint; that is,
whether or not the collected and reported data would be
ethical given the consequences of the specified action
(utilitarianism) or the duty and obligations related to
that action (deontology). In [65], researchers developed
what has become widely accepted approach for designing
ethical social engineering experiments, but the method
proposed focuses solely on phishing emails and it is
unclear how it can be extended to a wider range of
semantic attacks and platforms other than email.
As well as ethics approval, semantic attack research
poses legal implications [66], where researchers are in-
creasingly conducting phishing experiments without the
knowing consent of participants. In this case, the data
collected may prove more representative of natural user
behaviour, but cannot be validated as legitimate research
without formal approval.
One approach towards tackling this fundamental problem
in the research of semantic social engineering attacks is
to provide a platform that enables users and organisations
to anonymously report semantic attacks, without omitting
crucial contextual information such as whether the attack
was successful or not, the scenario in which the attack
occurred, whether or not the target had been trained, etc.
This database of user susceptibility information would
provide an invaluable resource for researchers seeking
to analyse trends or predict behaviour to semantic at-
tacks. Most importantly, collection of data in this format
removes the complexity and damaging effect on user
experiment data that ethics approval may require.
• The experiment population against data collection
detail tradeoff. Participants in semantic attack research
tend to be recruited from the institution in which the study
is conducted (e.g., university students, organisation’s own
staff, etc.) and often this is noted as a limitation of the
research as the results may not be representative the
wider target population. This poses a major problem for
empirically proving the validity of research outcomes. In
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the first study, we recruited a large number of participants
from multiple different geographical locations on the
Internet, but this approach limits the ability to collect
more detailed data from the participants. There is a
tradeoff to be considered when recruiting participants
that are more representative of the user base against
the qualitative data that can be extracted from a user
population that is easily accessible. In the case of the
former, collecting user responses from a large number
of disparate demographic backgrounds is fairly simple
when the Internet is the recruitment platform, but these
participants cannot be easily observed or interviewed at
any stage of the research. For the latter, researchers have
localised access to participants and therefore a higher
degree of detail regarding user behaviour can be recorded
and analysed.
Ultimately, semantic attack research is affected by both
circumstances and as such context should dictate the most
suitable approach. In our study, it was more important
to recruit sufficient numbers of participants to allow the
evaluation of statistical machine learning models. For
research focusing on psychological impact of exploitation
from semantic attacks, detailed qualitative data may be a
more relevant goal, in which case research would most
likely benefit from a smaller population.
• Attack coverage. In table I, the majority of research
related to predicting susceptibility to social engineering
attacks has focused on phishing, which is only one
type of semantic attack. Conclusions made from research
solely reliant phishing experiments may not be applicable
to the wider problem space. Like traditional network
and operating attacks, there are many types of semantic
attack, crossing multiple platforms, and therefore like an
anti-virus for OS or firewall for the network, it is crucial
that experiments consider and evaluate a wide range of se-
mantic attacks in order to build defence systems that can
mitigate multiple threats. Furthermore, specific attacks
may become less popular over time as new platforms
emerge or more successful techniques are developed, and
therefore it is also important that an experiments results
remain relevant for addressing future attacks.
In [1], the taxonomy for semantic attacks can provide a
useful baseline to build such experiments that measure
user susceptibility across a series of generic attack at-
tributes. In this study, we have included Deception Vector
only for clustering attacks on the same and different
platforms, simplifying the modelling process and ability
to classify susceptibility with a single, general model.
For research aiming to understand user vulnerabilities to
removable media or targeted cyber-supply chains, other
items of the taxonomy such as Method of Distribution
and Target Description may provide useful categories for
clustering a wide range of attacks in a single experiment.
• Lack of an authoritative archive. Repositories of his-
toric and current phishing emails and websites do exist
[67]–[69], but do not cover the wider range of semantic
attacks and do not include data on the profiles of the
users who have or have not been deceived by them. An
open archive of semantic attacks and corresponding user
profile data would be immensely helpful to researchers
in this field.
C. Human as a Security Sensor (HaaSS)
The concept of the human as a sensor has been used
extensively and successfully for the detection of threats
and adverse conditions in physical space, for instance
to detect noise pollution [70], monitor water availability
[71], detect unfolding emergencies [72] etc. In relation to
semantic attack threats, the concept is very new. There is
one example specifically for phishing attacks [36]. We ar-
gue that the concept can be explored much further and for
most semantic attacks, where the human user’s situational
knowledge can help detect attacks that are otherwise
largely undetectable by technical security systems. For
example, there are no known technical countermeasures
to attack E11 in experiment 1 (“Qrishing”) and attack E1
in experiment 2 (Video masquerading “clickbait”), but
in our experiments, users were able to detect them with
a probability of 86% and 78% respectively (see Table
II). This is certainly not a rigorous way for evaluating
HaaSS, but we feel is an indication of its potential.
Introducing a HaaSS element in an organisation’s security
can empower users to become its strongest link. In this
context, predicting the performance of an individual user
as human sensor of semantic social engineering attacks is
the equivalent of measuring the reliability of a physical
sensor. For example, within a HaaSS reporting platform, a
prediction model that measures the probability of a user’s
report being correct can provide security engineers with
the ability to triage the review of reports; prioritising the
ones from users that are more accurate human sensors.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have conducted two experiments, each consisting a
survey and an exhibit-based test, asking participants to identify
whether specific exhibits were likely to show attacks or not.
Based on the data collected, we identified a set of features
from which we produced logistic regression and random
forest models for predicting susceptibility to semantic attacks,
with accuracy rates of .68 and .71 respectively. The slight
performance advantage of RF over LR is countered by the
larger number of features that it requires to be monitored
(16 against LR’s 7). In terms of the features themselves, we
observe that security training makes a noticeable difference in
a user’s ability to detect deception attempts, with frequent self-
study appearing to be a key differentiator. Yet, formal security
education through lectures was not chosen as a useful predictor
by any of the models and for any of the exhibits. More
important features were computer literacy, familiarity and fre-
quency of access to a specific platform. The models developed
can be configured in terms of preference in minimising false
positives, minimising false negatives or maximising accuracy,
based on the probability threshold over which a user would
be deemed to be susceptible to an attack. For both models, a
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threshold choice of 0.55 would keep both false positives and
false negatives below 0.2.
We have also identified a number of challenges associated
with developing datasets for predicting susceptibility to se-
mantic attacks, where addressing these challenges can help
produce rich and representative user susceptibility data that
can aid developers and researchers of user security defence
systems. In future work, our model can be experimentally
validated with a technical implementation and using a wider
range of semantic attacks for each deception vector in order
to provide empirical results for the model’s performance in
practice. As deception-based attacks utilised in the wild evolve
continuously, the baseline model and classification rules can be
continuously improved with new training data from different
user populations and attack types.
Furthermore, the advent of the Internet of Things [73]
promises to compound the problem and extend to physical
impact, exposing user interfaces of systems previously inacces-
sible to the standard user, let alone via a distributed application
in the Internet [74]. The more effective such cyber-physical
attacks prove, the more the deception attack surface will
grow. Semantic social engineering threats in the Internet of
Everything are likely to expand attack surfaces via ubiquitous
connectivity which practically facilitate new and convincing
semantic attacks; the impact of a phishing email may no longer
be limited to stolen user credentials or malware infection, but
can also bring down a national power-grid [75]. Providing
users with the ability to report suspected semantic attacks
can help provide system developers and security practitioners
with key insights in how to design or update systems to
mitigate such threats, while at the same time instilling users
with a sense of empowerment in protecting their technological
environment. To this end, report credibility provides a crucial
role in identifying the likelihood that an attack has indeed
occurred, so as to prioritise reports and utilise their information
to augment defence mechanisms. Predicting user susceptibility
as a performance measure of semantic social engineering
attack reporting provides a first step towards this vision.
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